Publicación: Wittgenstein’s foundational stance
| dc.title | Wittgenstein’s foundational stance | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dcterms.isReferencedBy | Wittgenstein’s stance vis-à-vis Moore’s and the skeptics’ arguments concerning justification of knowledge is discussed. His peculiar foundationalist point of view is thus highlighted: truth and falsity, knowledge and justification, take place in a language game. Outside it, foundations lie at a level where categories different from those of the language game apply. Consequently, as will be shown, certainty appears at a distance from knowledge, rooted in the nonrational pre-propositional ground, and not susceptible of proof or justification. | |
| dcterms.medium | https://estudiosepistemologia.ct.unt.edu.ar/article/view/25 | |
| dcterms.publisher | spa | |
| dcterms.rights | Derechos de autor 2023 Estudios de Epistemología | |
| dcterms.tableOfContents | 2023-09-09 | |
| dcterms.title | Estudios de Epistemología; Vol. 6 (2008): Estudios de Epsitemología N°6; 40-46 | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| eperson.phone | Gómez , Graciela |
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