The phenomenological-experiential primacy of simple grasping

Abstract

This document exposes and develops the problems generated by philosophies (Pragmatism and Aristotelianism) that overshadow the exclusively qualitative aspect in the relation of grasping within knowledge, between the dual subject-object relation, showing the collapse reached by objectifying this relation, where at the beginning of philosophy with Aristotle there is a “forgetting of the phenomenological experience of the subject” in pursuit of the conceptual production of philosophical technicalities to give a firm ground (however apparent it may be) of the way in which metaphysical problems have to be solved. After this, the importance of the first simple grasp of the knowledge of the real from Bergson's metaphysics will be remarked, justifying how from the operation of intelligence, philosophers have abused technique in philosophical work, returning to the notion of intuition and complementing it with the phenomenological contributions of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on perception and the experience of the perceiving subject, the way in which the subject and the world or reality must be understood will be stipulated.